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The view that households are credit rationed by the formal sector, rests on the 
assumptions that all households have a positive demand for formal credit and it is a cheaper 
source for borrowing. To empirically verify formal credit rationing three different models 
are estimated in this paper. The first model is a conventional credit-rationing model. The 
second model assumes that the probability to borrow from the formal sector is jointly 
determined by the demand for credit and the decision of the bank on access. Finally, the 
third model relaxes both these assumptions and the household chooses between borrowing 
from the formal or the informal sector. Empirical results using recently collected data from 
Puri, India, confirm that the access to the formal sector in the rural credit markets is limited 
and there exists a high demand for credit. This suggests a high degree of effective credit 
rationing by the formal sector in Puri. 
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1.  I NTRODUCTION 
 
Most theoretical and empirical studies of rural credit markets assume that they are 
characterised by high lending costs and a high demand for credit, resulting in high 
interest rates being charged to the borrowers. It is further assumed that all households 
have a positive demand for formal credit and that the formal sector, which is bound by 
the government regulations to lend at a subsidised fixed interest rate, is the cheapest 
source of credit. Models based on such assumptions usually suggest wide scale credit 
rationing by the formal sector. However, this might not always be true as the degree of 
effective credit rationing might not be as high as it is generally assumed in literature and 
farm households may have a low demand for credit.   
This paper is an empirical investigation into the extent of effective credit rationing 
by the formal sector in the rural credit markets of Puri. It is based on the Kochar (1991, 
1997) where the household is free to choose between the formal and the informal sector. 
However, the empirical model is further modified to include the additional information 
on the ‘access to credit’ that is available in our survey data. Another important RANJULA BALI SWAIN  2
contribution of the paper is to update the situation on the extent of formal credit 
rationing existing in the rural credit markets in Puri, India, by using recently collected 
data. 
Three different scenarios are considered for the estimation of the effective degree of 
credit rationing. The first model assumes that the probability of borrowing from the 
formal sector is determined by the bank’s decision on access. Two assumptions are 
made here. Firstly, that the formal sector provides the cheaper source of credit. Secondly, 
that all households have a positive demand for formal credit. The second model drops 
the latter assumption and the probability of borrowing from the formal sector is jointly 
determined by the demand for credit and the bank’s decision on access. Finally, the third 
model considers a two-sector model (formal and informal credit sector) with the 
household choosing to borrow from the cheaper source of credit. 
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on the ‘Rural Credit Market Survey of 
Puri district in India’.
1 The survey has information on 1052 households that were 
selected by a two stage stratified sample, from 66 villages, spread over the 11 
administrative blocks of the Puri district, which is the coastal district of Orissa, in east 
India. After deleting the households with missing values on some of the variables we are 
left with information on 989 households. Of the 989 households 761 were identified as 
farm households. The analysis in this paper is based on these farm households, as there 
might be a  basic difference between the demand for credit and the cost of supplying 
credit to a farm and a non-farm household. 
The following section presents a short review of the government interventions in the 
rural credit markets of India. The subsequent section examines some of the emerging 
patterns.  Section 4 describes the econometric framework which is adapted to the 
additional information on ‘access to credit’ in the survey data. It also gives a concise 
description of the variables used in the analysis. The results of the estimation of the three 
different models of sectoral choice are explained in Section 5 of the paper. Finally, the 
last section presents the concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.    INTERVENTIONS IN THE CREDIT MARKETS 
 
Historically, the informal sector has played a dominant role in the rural credit 
markets of India. According to the All-India Rural Investment Survey, in 1951-52, 
almost 83 percent of the cash loans were provided by the professional moneylenders 
whereas the formal institutions provided only 8.7  percent. The Government of India 
decided to actively intervene in the credit market with the commencement of the 
Integrated Scheme of Rural Credit (1951). The aim was to set about a systematic 
expansion of the institutional credit infrastructure, with the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
 
1 The survey was conducted and supervised by the author in 1997. CREDIT RATIONING IN RURAL INDIA  3
in the pivotal role. The emphasis of the active government intervention in the credit 
market has been to provide subsidised loans to agricultural and other priority sectors
2 
for investment purposes for development of the weakest sections of the rural populations 
and modernising agriculture. 
In the fifties and the sixties the co-operatives were the main agency of distribution of 
formal credit. To meet the fast expanding demands for credit a multi-pronged credit 
delivery system was introduced. In 1969, major commercial banks were nationalised
3 
with the specific objective of lending a certain percentage of their credit to the priority 
sectors.   
In 1982 the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) was 
set up by the RBI for providing all types of production and investment credit for 
agricultural and rural development. NABARD is the apex institution accredited with all 
matters concerning policy, planning and operations in the field of credit for agriculture 
and other economic activities in rural areas.
4 In addition to other functions, it 
co-ordinates the rural financing activities of all institutions engaged in developmental 
work at the field level and maintains liaison with Government of India, State 
governments, RBI and other national level institutions.   
Furthermore, a scheme of Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) and that of 
specialised branches for agriculture and small-scale industries were introduced in 
1995-96 with a view of augmenting the flow of credit to the rural sector. In 1996-97, out 
of the target of 40 per cent of the net bank credit of the domestic commercial banks to 
the priority sector, 18 per cent had to be disbursed in the form of credit for agriculture 
(The Annual Report on the Working of the Reserve Bank of India (1997), Section 1.29). 
As of the end of March 1997, the public sector banks had exceeded their priority sector 
 
2 Priority sectors include agriculture, small scale industries, retail, trade and small businesses, road and 
water transport operators, professional and self employed and education, housing to weaker sections and 
consumption loans etc. 
3 The All India Credit Review Committee (1969) supported the view that commercial banks should 
increasingly extend finance in rural areas. This process was accelerated by the nationalisation of 14 major 
commercial banks in July 1969 and another 6 banks in 1980. The Committee to Review Arrangements for 
Institutional Credit for Agricultural and Rural Development (CRAFICARD), 1981, which assessed the role of 
commercial banks in rural credit endorsed the view that commercial banks could play a significant role in the 
various programmes of rural development and made a series of recommendations to improve the quality of 
lending through commercial banks. The public sector banks numbering 28 (20 nationalised banks and  State 
Bank of India and its 7 associates) now account for more than 90 percent of the total business of all scheduled 
commercial banks. 
4 Its prime role is to provide credit for the promotion of agriculture, small scale industries, cottage and 
village industries, handicrafts and other rural crafts and other allied economic activities in rural areas with a 
view to promoting integrated rural development and securing prosperity of rural areas and for matters 
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credit target with a total lending of Rs. 791,310 million constituting 41.7 per cent of the 
net bank credit. Disbursement to agriculture under the special agricultural credit plans, 
prepared on the advice of the RBI, was Rs. 127,160 million during 1996-97 (the Annual 
Report on the Working of the Reserve Bank of India (1997)).   
These specific efforts to increase the outreach of formal credit in the rural credit 
markets have given positive results. From nearly 83 percent in 1951, the proportion of 
cash debt from moneylender has gone down to 36.1 per cent in 1971. According to the 
report on ‘A Review of the Agricultural Credit System in India’ (1990) the percentage of 
borrowings of the rural households (cultivators) from the formal sector to the total debt 
has increased from 29 (31.7) percent in 1971 to 61.2 (63.3) percent in 1981. However, 
this expansion of the institutional l ending in the rural areas failed to reach a larger 
number of cultivator households and did not lead to any major increase in the 
agricultural capital stock per farm (Binswanger and Khandker (1995)).   
In 1981-82 only 13 percent of the rural cultivator households in India had 
outstanding loans from the formal sector.
5 The unequal distribution of the formal credit 
was reflected by the fact that cultivators who owned more than Rs. 100,000 in assets 
received 17 percent of the formal loans whereas they constituted only 10 percent of the 
total cultivator households. In the highest asset group in rural areas (owning more than 
Rs. 500,000) 85 percent of the cash dues were outstanding to the formal credit 
institutions whereas only 15 percent were outstanding to the informal institutions. In 
sharp contrast for the lowest assets group (owning assists of up to Rs 1000) nearly 94.2 




3.    EMERGING PATTERNS IN THE RURAL CREDIT MARKET 
 
The provision of subsidised loans by the formal credit institutions has led to the 
general belief in literature that there exists excess demand for the formal credit and 
limited access to the formal credit institutions. Moreover the credit rationing is believed 
to be in favour of the households in more productive regions and of larger farm 
households that are economically and politically more powerful. This is believed to have 
lead to a further widening of the income inequalities (Adams et al. (1984), Braverman 
and Stiglitz (1989)). However, it is difficult to conclude that this is observed due to the 
type of formal credit and its lending rules. The lower number of households demanding 
loans from the formal sector might be a choice decision of the household. The farms, 
which are small and fragmented, are in areas with a low level of infrastructure facilities 
or which already have a high capital stock will have a low return on capital. Such 
 
5 According to Binswanger and Khandker (1995) the data from the All-India Debt and Investment 
Surveys of 1981-88 appear to seriously underestimate debt of cultivators. CREDIT RATIONING IN RURAL INDIA  5
households restrict their demand for production loans even if they have access to them. 
The extent of the effective formal sector rationing cannot be inferred from the proportion 
of the non-borrower households alone, the demand side also needs to be taken into 
account. 
The distribution of the borrowers in our survey data shows a similar pattern. The 
formal institutions favour land owning households, in particular those with large farms, 
as is evident from the higher share of formal borrowers in the category of households 
owning more than 4 hectares of land (Table 1). In terms of the total amount borrowed, 
almost 67 percent is borrowed from the formal sector. The inequalities in the dispersion 
of credit in favour of the large and the medium farm households are reflected by the fact 
that 28. 2 percent of the total borrowers take 46 percent of the total amount borrowed 
from the formal sector in loans. 
 
   
Table 1.    Distribution of Borrowers by Farm Size
1) 
  Farm Size (in hectares)   
  0-1  1-2  2-4  more than 4  Total 
  marginal  small  medium  large   
All Households  380 (49.9)  196 (25.8)  152 (20)  33 (4.3)  761 (100) 
All Borrowers
2) 
Share of borrowers out  














Share of formal sector 













Share of informal sector 












1) The figure in the parenthesis is the percentage of the cell with respect to its respective row total. This 
gives us the percentage of that particular category of households with respect to the farm size category. 
2) The 
percentage of each cell in this row is calculated with respect to their corresponding cell in the first row and is 
the lower figure in the cell. This gives us the percent of borrowers in each farm size category. 
3) The 
percentage of each cell in these rows is calculated with respect to the frequency of their corresponding cell in 
the all second row and is the lower figure in the cell. This gives the percent of the formal or the informal 
borrowers with respect to the total borrowers in each farm size category. 
Source: Survey Data. 
 
 
Never the less the informal sector continues to play an important role in the rural 
credit markets. Sources of informal credit like friends and relatives, traders and RANJULA BALI SWAIN  6
commission agents and landlords have shown an increase in the proportion of cash debt 
from 8.4 percent to 32.3 percent from 1951 to 1971. In 1981, friends and relatives were 
the most important source of informal credit providing 24 percent of the total informal 
loans in India (Bell  (1990)). In our survey data friends and relatives are the second 
largest lending group within the informal sector with 17.6 per cent of all households 
borrowing from them. Informal lenders charge a higher interest rate as compared to the 
formal sector. This could reflect the high risk, administrative or opportunity costs faced 
by them. However, the informal sector based on their social and geographic proximity to 
the lender also face a lower screening, monitoring and enforcement costs. Therefore, 
although some informal lenders charge a higher interest rate than the formal lenders, 
there exist other informal lenders that charge a lower interest rate as compared to the 
formal sector’s interest rate. This is often the case for the category of friends and 
relatives.   
The formal interest rates on the other hand are administered by the RBI. The 
following structure was imposed on the interest rates charged: for loans below Rs. 
25,000 an interest rate of 12 per cent was charged, for loans between Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 
200,000, interest rate was 13.5 per cent, whereas for loans bigger than Rs. 200,000 the 
banks were free to fix their own interest rates.
6 
The overall picture that emerges is that of a formal sector in the rural market that is 
bound by the government regulations to lend a certain fixed percent of its net bank credit 
to the priority sector on a fixed interest rate structure. Whereas, the informal sector is 
free to charge any interest rate based on it’s cost and profit considerations. 
 
 
4.   ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
 
Given the above considerations of the rural credit markets this section seeks to set up 
three different models. The first model depicts the most prevalent scenario in literature. 
It assumes that the formal borrowing is determined by the bank’s decision on access 
(Univariate Probit Model). The second model is a further generalisation where the 
probability of borrowing from the formal sector is jointly determined by the bank’s 
decision on access as well as the household’s demand for loans (Bivariate Probit Model 
with partial observability). The third model estimates the complete theoretical model 
where the households may have zero demand for formal credit and they are free to 
choose between the informal sector and the formal (Two-Sector Model). 
 
A.   The Univariate Probit Model (Model I) 
 
In line with popular belief in literature this model also assumes that the formal sector 
 
6 97 per cent of the loans in our sample were of amounts smaller than Rs. 25,000. CREDIT RATIONING IN RURAL INDIA  7
determines whether the household has access to its loan or not. Such an assumption 
implies that the formal credit is the cheapest source of credit for all households and that 
all households have a positive demand for formal credit at the existing interest rate. The 
probability of borrowing is given by a univariate normal distribution which reflects that 
(1) the probability of household’s demand for formal credit, (2) the probability of access 
to formal credit and the (3) probability that the formal credit costs less than the informal 
credit, is dependent on the formal sector interest rate. This interest rate is fixed by the 
government, but the stipulated interest rate varies across households of different 
geographical regions and by the farm size.   
The formal sector interest rate is predicted for all the households by taking predictors 
that are exogenous to the decision of taking credit. The interest rates on the loans taken 
from the formal sector are regressed on the dummy for the administrative blocks, 
reflecting the agro economic stratum’ to which the household belongs and size of the 
land owned by the household.
7   
 
B.   Bivariate Probit Model With Partial Observability (Model II) 
 
The univariate probit model is one particular interpretation of the market based on 
unrealistic assumptions, therefore further models are estimated. The bivariate probit 
model with partial observability drops the assumption that all households have a positive 
demand for formal credit. The probability of borrowing from the formal sector is jointly 
determined by the demand for credit and the bank’s decision on access. The formal 
structure of the model is as follows: 
 
; 0 , 0 1 ; 1 1 1 1 1 1 else z if y z i i i i i > = + ¢ = e X â  
 
; 0 , 0 1 ; 2 2 2 2 2 2 else z if y z i i i i i > = + ¢ = e X â  
 
2 1, i i e e ~ ) , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 ( r BVN , 
 
where  1 i X  is the vector of variables determining the access to the loan and  2 i X  are the 
explanatory variables determining the demand for loan. Instead of observing both  1 i y  
and  2 i y  we observe the product,  2 1y y y =  where  1 y  and  2 y  are simultaneously 
determined and  1 e  and  2 e  are correlated (Poirier 1980). The log-likelihood for this 
model is   
 
7 For the data used in Kochar (1997) this regression explains almost all the variability in the formal sector 
interest rate with an R square of 0.95 whereas for our estimation it is only around 0.45. This might be due to 
the fact that the sample data for this paper was collected from a smaller geographical region (within a 
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where  2 F  is the bivariate cumulative normal distribution function. 
 
C.   The Two-Sector Model (Model III) 
 
The econometric specification in this section is based on the theoretical model 
derived in Kochar (1991, 1997). However, the econometric model has been further 
adapted to the information that is available in the sample data on the access of the 
household to credit.
8 Furthermore, some empirical changes have been introduced as the 
data in the sample was collected at the district level
9 and has considerably less variation. 
A linear approximation of the household’s loan demand schedule and the sectoral 
supply schedules available to the household are specified as: 
 
1 1 1 1 v r B
d + - = d ã X ,  Loan demand.                                  (1a) 
 
2 2 2 2 v r B
s
f + - = d ã X ,  Formal sector supply.                            (1b) 
 
3 3 3 3 v r B
s
i + - = d ã X ,  Informal sector supply.                           (1c) 
 
These yield the ‘reservation interest rate equations’, which are e stimated as the 
interest rate at which the optimal loan is zero 
 
1 1 1 1 1 ) , , 0 ( u u MR + = â X X ,  reservation demand rate.                       (2a) 
 
2 2 2 2 2 ) , , 0 ( u u MC
f + = â X X ,  reservation cost, formal sector.                (2b) 
 
3 3 3 3 3 ) , , 0 ( u u MC
i + = â X X ,  reservation cost, informal sector.                (2c) 
 
where the random variables  i u ,  i =1,2,3 are assumed to be i.i.d across households, 
though such omitted variables can be expected to enter into all three equations, yielding 
a non diagonal co-variance matrix of the error terms. The reservation schedules generate 
 
8 However, for reader’s convenience we continue to use the notation used in Kochar (1997) so that the 
modified likelihood function might be easily related to her model. 
9 India is divided into a number of states, each state is further divided into districts. Each districts is split 
into various administrative blocks. In Orissa, the Puri district has 11 administrative blocks.   CREDIT RATIONING IN RURAL INDIA  9
the following four index functions or selection rules: 
 
Pr(demands informal sector loan) = [ ] ) , , 0 ( ) , , 0 ( Pr 3 3 1 1 u MC u MR
i X X > , 
 
Pr(demands formal sector loan) = [ ] f r u MR > ) , , 0 ( Pr 1 1 X ,                     (3) 
 
Pr(access to formal) = [ ] f
f r u MC < ) , , 0 ( Pr 2 2 X , 
 
Pr(formal sector is lower cost) = [ ] f
i r u MC > ) , , 0 ( Pr 3 3 X . 
 
These index functions underlie the household’s participation decisions and the 
access decision of the formal sector, which generate the market outcomes. The choice 
between the sectors is determined by the household’s demand and by the supply 
decisions of the formal and the informal sectors, whereas the data only report market 
outcomes. Therefore, the information on individual demand and s upply schedules is 
unavailable. However, our survey has additional information on whether a household 
has access to credit or was denied credit in our data. The households in the sample were 
asked the question ‘did you try to take any loan during this year, but did not get it?’.
10 
Reported answers to this question give the information on whether the household had 
access to credit or not. It is difficult to know from the data if it was the formal or the 
informal credit sector that denied the loan to the household. The likelihood function is 
adjusted to include this information for the complete model. 
Combining the information on the borrowing of the household from the formal and 
the informal sector with the information on whether it had access to credit or was denied 
credit all the households are divided into five categories.
11 Those households, (I) which 
borrow from the formal sector, (II) those who borrowed from the informal sector but 
were not rationed and (III) those who borrowed from the informal sector but said that 
they were rationed. The two remaining categories include (IV) households that did not 
borrow even though they had access and (V) households that were non-borrowers 
because they were refused credit.
12 
 
10 We are aware that this does not completely capture the definition of rationing. Additional information 
is needed on: whether the household did not borrow because it expected that it would be turned down. In 
addition, one should also have information on whether the household was loan size rationed. Nevertheless, 
we have to work with the restricted amount of information that we have. 
11 Kochar (1997) divided the households into those who borrowed formal credit; those who borrowed  
informal credit and those who did not borrow credit at all. 
12 In Kochar (1997) the households borrowing from both sectors were allocated to either sector depending 
on which sector charged the lowest interest rate. If the formal (informal) sector interest was lowest the 
household was classified as a formal (informal) sector borrower. RANJULA BALI SWAIN  10
The sectoral outcomes are generated as follows: 
 
(I) Probability that the household borrows from formal sector 
 
) ) , , 0 ( , ) , , 0 ( , ) , , 0 ( Pr( 3 3 2 2 1 1 f
i
f f f r u MC r u MC r u MR > < > = X X X .             ( 4a) 
 
(II) Probability that the household borrows from the informal sector but is not rationed 
 
) ) , , 0 ( , ) , , 0 ( ) , , 0 ( Pr( 3 3 1 1 3 3 f
i i r u MC u MR u MC < < = X X X .                    (4b) 
 
(III) Probability that the household borrows from the informal sector and is rationed 
 
) ) , , 0 ( , ) , , 0 ( , ) , , 0 ( ) , , 0 ( Pr( 2 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 f
f
f
i i r u MC r u MC u MR u MC > > < = X X X X .  (4c) 
 
(IV) Probability that the household did not borrow even when they had access 
 
)) , , 0 ( ) , , 0 ( , ) , , 0 ( Pr( 1 1 3 3 1 1 u MR u MC r u MR
i
f X X X > < = .                      (4d) 
 
(V) Probability that the household did not borrow because they were rationed 
 




f X X X X > > > = .     (4e) 
 
The above equations reflect both the formal sector rationing and the optimal choices 
by the households. The data reports observed market outcomes; therefore the parameters 
of the equations have to be inferred from the joint occurrence of the individual decisions 
rules. The identification criterion for such models is relatively weak, requiring the 
distinction of one equation from the other. This may be achieved by varying the set of 
the explanatory variables across equations. Therefore, the sector-specific lending costs 
enter the set of 
2 X  and 
3 X  variables but not  1 X . The  i u ’s are assumed to be 
normally distributed with variance-covariance matrix  I ó
2 . 
The log likelihood of the sample for the model generated from the above sectoral 
outcomes is specified as: 
 
) ln( ) ln( ln 2 1 e i c
i
b a i y y L F + F F F =￿  
      ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 5 4 3 g i i h i g f i y y y F F + F + F F +  
 
where  i y ,  1 = i  to 5, is defined as follows: 
1 1 = y  if the household borrows from the formal sector,  1 2 = y  if the household CREDIT RATIONING IN RURAL INDIA  11
borrows from the informal sector but is not rationed,  1 3 = y  if the household borrows 
from the informal sector and is rationed,  1 4 = y  if household does not borrow and is not 
rationed and  = 5 y  if the household is a non borrower and is rationed, and: 
 
) ( 1 1 f a r - F = F â X , 
 
) ( 2 2 f b r + - F = F â X , 
 




( 1 3 3
3 3 1 1
2 r â X
â X â X
-
-




( 2 3 3
3 3 1 1
2 r f f r -
-
F = F â X
â X â X , 
 




( 1 1 1
1 1 3 3
2 r â X
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-
-




( 2 1 1
1 1 3 3
2 r f i r -
-
F = F â X
â X â X , 
 
where  F  is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution and  2 F   is 
the cumulative distribution function of the standardised bivariate normal distribution.   
 
D.   Description of Variables 
 
Table 2 gives the details on the means and the standard deviation of the various 
explanatory variables used in the estimations. The demand for loans will be affected by 
the household’s characteristics and the regional variation in agricultural productivity and 
infrastructure. The amount of land owned by the household, the quality of land and the 
number of earning and working members in the households all affect the demand for 
credit. The exogenous treatment of the amount of land owned is justified on grounds of 
limited transactions in the land sales market observed in India.
13 
 
13 For example, in a study of a village by Bliss and Stern (1982) the distribution of village land in 1974-75 
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Table 2.  Description of Variables Used in the Regressions 
Variable  Description  Mean (Std. deviation) 
Household Characteristics     
Interest Rate  predicted formal interest rate  14.5 (1.7) 
Land Owned  amount of land owned by the 
household 
1.3 (1.1) 




Males  Number of working male members 
in household 
1.9 (1.1) 
Financial Assets  financial assets of the household  3856.4 (10359.9) 
Family Size  Number of members in the family  8.5 (4.7) 
Age    age of the head of household  48.0 (12.9) 
Village/Block Characteristics     
Road  the distance of the village from the 
nearest ‘concrete road’ 
3.2 (3.7) 
Fyield95  The yield of paddy (dry paddy with 
husks) has been taken at the block 
level for 1995 
21.9 (5.0) 
Plancult  Planned amount of the bank credit 
dispersed for all purposes 
0.01 (0.004) 




1) The survey asked the question ‘What is the soil quality of the land that you own?’ To this the replies 
were average, saline, sandy and others. The average and others soil quality has been classified as good land 
quality.   
 
 
Formal and Informal sector supply schedules are functions of the set of variables just 
described as they affect the farm productivity and the demand for loans. The formal 
sector schedule is identified by the planned amount of credit disbursed per cultivator for 
all purposes, agricultural and non-agricultural. This variable affects the cost of loans to 
cultivators, given that bank lending for agriculture is required to be a fixed percentage of 
the total formal credit. This implies that if the planned amount of credit disbursed 
increases it should imply an increase in access to formal sector. The information on this 
variable is available at the block level. The regional dummies are also used to identify 
the formal sector in the two-sector model (Model III). The regional dummies reflect the 
differences in operation of the formal institutions that operate in certain areas and are a 
function of existence of businesses, farm efficiency, market opportunities and other 
 
closely reflected that before Independence (1947), and that land is rarely bought or sold. CREDIT RATIONING IN RURAL INDIA  13
differences. 
The demand schedule is further identified from the formal sector supply schedule by 
the number of working members in the household. The banks are officially required to 
evaluate the loan on the basis of the incremental income expected from the project that is 
financed. Evaluation studies of some banks show that family labour was not included 
while making these calculations
14 and therefore this variable should not affect the 
access to the formal sector. The informal sector is identified on the basis of the financial 
assets of the households.   
 
 
5.    RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
A.   The Univariate Probit Model 
 
It is widely believed in empirical literature that the households have a positive 
demand for the formal credit, which is the cheaper source of credit for all households. 
This implies the existence of wide spread credit rationing by the formal sector. Model I 
assumes that the probability of borrowing from the formal sector is determined 
completely by the bank which decides whether a household should get a loan or not. 
Thus the access to formal credit is a bank’s decision as all households have a positive 
demand for formal credit. 
According to the estimation results in Table 3 the probability of access is determined 
by the amount of land owned by the households, the land quality, family size, the 
amount of planned bank credit dispersed for all purposes per cultivator, the average 
monsoon rain and the food grain yield per hectare. The larger the size of land owned by 
the household, the greater is the probability of its access to the formal sector. A better 
land quality also improves the household’s prospects of access to loan and hence 
borrowing. Food grain yield per hectare is used as a proxy for the level of infrastructure 
development of the region in which the household is located. Households in more 
developed areas with a higher level of infrastructure facility have better access to a 
formal sector loan. This is especially true for households located in areas near the bank 
branches, which are nearly always located in the area, near the block’s headquarters. 
Proximity to the bank branches, government offices and pesticides and fertiliser shops 
also decreases the level of transaction costs for such households. Expectation of good 
weather and environmental factors proxied by the average monsoon rainfall implies 
expectation of a higher demand and higher production of output and hence has a positive 
effect on access to credit.   
The planned amount of bank credit to be dispersed for all p urposes per cultivator 
however is negatively related to the formal sector access. One reason for this 
 
14 For example, UCO Bank (1999). RANJULA BALI SWAIN  14
discrepancy might be arising from the fact that the banks do not follow the official 
targets for lending to the agricultural and the priority sector at the ‘block level’. Another 
reason could be that this model is mis-specified as compared to the bivariate model, 
where the coefficient for the planned amount of bank credit to be dispersed for all 
purposes per cultivator has the expected sign (though it is insignificant). 
The model predicts a high degree of rationing by the formal sector. The probability 
of access to the formal sector yields the value 0.29. This value is evaluated at the mean 
levels of the explanatory variables. Therefore, under the assumptions of model I 71 
percent of the households are credit rationed by the formal sector.
15   
 
 
Table 3.  Univariate Probit Model of Access to Formal Credit 
Variable  Parameter Estimates  Standard Error 
Constant  -1.020
a  0.930 
Predicted interest rate  -0.080
a  0.070 
Amount of land owned (hectares.)  0.130
***  0.040 
Land quality  0.240
*  0.150 
Amount of planned bank credit dispersed 
for all purposes per cultivator 
-76.010
***  28.060 
Age of the household head  -0.002
a  0.004 
Size of the household  0.019
*  0.011 
Food grain yield per hectare in 1995  0.050
**  0.020 
Monsoon rain in 1995  0.004
*  0.002 
Puri Sadar  0.180
a  0.510 
Kakatpur  -0.270
a  0.260 
Astarang  -0.230
a  0.190 
Kanas  0.070
a  0.240 
Pr (access)  0.29
a   
Log Likelihood  -410.6
a   
Sample Size  761




***) indicates significance at 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
 
 
B.   The Bivariate Probit Model 
 
Model II specifies the probability of access to the formal sector as a bivariate normal 
distribution, jointly determined by the demand for credit and the decision of the bank on 
 
15 From data covering a much larger part of India, Kochar (1997) finds that 81% of the households were 
rationed under similar assumptions as Model I. However, these results are based on data that was collected in 
1981 whereas our data is much more recent (1996). CREDIT RATIONING IN RURAL INDIA  15
whether it wants to lend to the household or not. Although it no longer assumes that all 
households have a positive demand for the formal sector, it is still considered to be the 
cheaper source of credit. This yields the differences in the estimates of the Model I and 
Model II. Interest rates have a marginally negative effect on the probability of demand 
for loans whereas its effect on access is weakly positive but statistically insignificant. It 
has often been claimed in literature that it is the large land owning farmers that benefit 
from the access to the subsidised formal credit in the developing countries (Braverman 
and Guasch (1986)). The results from Model II confirm this to a certain extent (Table 4). 
The amount of land owned and the quality of land both have a positive and significant 
effect on the access to formal credit, however, their effect on the demand for loans is 
negative and insignificant. 
 
 
Table 4.   Bivariate Probit Model of Demand and Access to Formal Credit 
Access  Demand 
Variable 
Parameter est.  Std. error  Parameter est.  Std. error 
Constant  -3.100
a  408813.6  2.314
a  2.83 
Predicted interest rate  0.100
a  0.131  -0.329
**  0.157 
Amount of land owned (hectares.)  0.188
**  0.080  -0.13
a  0.108 
Land quality    0.783
***  0.243  -2.367
***  0.772 
Age of the household head  -0.002
a  0.005  0.001
a  0.010 
Size of the household  0.035
**  0.018  0.0001
a  0.030 
Amount of planned bank credit 
dispersed for all purposes per 
cultivator   
-25.038
a  37.369  -  - 
Food grain yield per hectare in 
1995 
-0.052
a  0.046  0.253
**  0.127 
Monsoon rain in 1995  0.009
a  0.003  0.001
a  0.009 
Distance from the road  -0.041
a  0.031  0.094
*  0.052 
Number of working male members 
in the household 
-  -  -0.127
a  0.114 
Puri Sadar  -0.654
a  0.789  -  - 
Astarang  -0.504
**  0.265  -  - 
Kakatpur  -0.708
a  0.438  -  - 
Kanas  0.373
a  0.377  -  - 
Rho  -0.98 
Pr (access and demand)  0.40 
Log Likelihood  -394.44 




***) indicates significance at 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
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In contrast to the results from Model I, access to formal sector is not affected by 
infrastructural and weather factors like the food grain yield per hectare and the average 
monsoon rain. Distinguishing between the demand and the access is responsible for the 
differences in the results of Model I and II. Food grain yield and the road variable, both 
of which reflect the level of infrastructural development of the region positively affect 
demand. Households living in such regions have easier access to facilities, lower 
transaction costs and better accessibility to their markets and as such have a h igher 
demand for credit. The factors determining the access to the formal sector and the 
demand for credit are distinct, with formal credit access mainly determined by the land 
variables (size of land owned and the quality of land).   
The probability of access to the formal sector given the demand and access is 40 
percent implying that nearly 60 percent of the households are credit rationed. 
Considering that all households in the rural credit markets of Puri might not have a 
positive demand for formal credit implies that the households are not as constrained as 
Model I suggests and this is confirmed by the higher probability of access to the formal 
sector in Model II. 
 
C.   The Two-Sector Model   
 
The rural credit markets have a diverse set of lenders and credit from formal 
institutions might not always be the cheapest. Credit from friends and relatives, 
landlords and employer might be offered at lower interest rates than the formal credit. 
Model III is a general model where the household with a positive demand for credit can 
make the choice of borrowing from either of the two sectors, the formal or the informal. 
It therefore relaxes the assumption that the formal sector is the cheapest source of credit. 
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 5. 
Model III confirms the results from Model II that access to formal credit increases 
with the size of land owned. The larger the amount of land owned the smaller is the 
reservation cost of the formal sector and leads to an increase in access to the formal 
sector. Distance of the household from the nearest road reflecting the infrastructural 
development of the region where the household is located shows that access to formal 
credit for households located near roads increases. The regional block dummies are the 
catch all for the differences in the regional variations for the formal sector and are all 
statistically significant in determining the access to the formal sector. The amount of 
planned bank credit dispersed for all purposes per cultivator is also a significant but with 
a positive sign, which is contrary to expectation. This may be explained by the fact that 
the planning for the amount of the credit dispersed is done in terms of the needs of the 
different activities at the block level. However, targets for lending to the priority sector 
are set and followed at the district and not the block levels. This discrepancy between 
the planning and the implementation at the block level might be responsible for the 
unexpected sign. CREDIT RATIONING IN RURAL INDIA  17
Table 5.    Model of Demand and Access to Formal and Informal Credit
1) 
Variable  Demand 
Reservation cost 
for the formal 
sector 
Reservation cost 
for the informal 
sector 
Constant  12.907
*** (0.240)  12.201
*** (0.492)  14.764
*** (0.315) 
Amount of land owned (hectares.)  -0.380
*** (0.061)  -0.612
*** (0.080)  0.035
*** (0.074) 
Land quality  0.256
*** (0.053)  0.0003
*** (0.084)  -0.081
*** (0.065) 
Family size  0.458
*** (0.076)  -0.043
*** (0.068)  0.092
*** (0.070) 
Age of the household head  0.271
*** (0.053)  0.088
2** (0.065)  0.122
*** (0.070) 
Distance from the road  0.407
*** (0.060)  0.285
*** (0.083)  0.580
*** (0.064) 
Number of working members in 
the household 
-0.260
*** (0.072)  -  - 
Amount of planned bank credit 
dispersed for all purposes per 
cultivator   
-  0.338
*** (0.101)  - 
Puri  -  1.307
*** (0.098)  - 
Kakatpur  -  0.507
*** (0.065)  - 
Astarang  -  0.940
*** (0.098)  - 
Kanas  -  0.872
*** (0.080)  - 
Financial assets  -    -0.1641
*** (0.048) 
Pr (access to formal sector)  0.53   
Pr (demand)  0.76   
Pr (formal sector is cheaper)  0.72   
Pr (access/demand, formal sector 
 is cheaper) 
0.28   
Mean Log Likelihood  -2.12 
Sample Size  761 
Notes: 
1) The model was estimated allowing  1 r  and  2 r  to take any value. The parameter estimates (standard 




***) indicates significance at 10% (5%, 
1%) level. Figures in the bracket are standard errors. 
 
 
Although land ownership increases access to formal loans, the estimates of the 
reservation cost for the informal sector shows that it has no effect on the access to 
informal loans. The variables that determine access to informal loans are the age of the 
head of household, the distance from the road and the financial assets owned by the 
household. Distance from the road is a proxy for the infrastructure development of the 
region in which the household is located. Proximity to the road implies a lower 
reservation cost for the informal sector and implies greater access to informal credit. 
Similarly, households with larger financial assets face a lower reservation cost for 
informal sector and hence have greater access to informal credit. 
The factors that determine the demand for the households are amount of land owned, RANJULA BALI SWAIN  18
land quality, family size, age of the household’s head and the number of working male 
members in the household. The negative relation between the amount of loan owned and 
the credit demanded results from the fact that very large landowners and households 
with small and fragmented farms have a low demand for credit. The number of males 
earning in the household might be engaged in primary activities other than cultivation 
for example, working as a salaried personal etc., which would imply a fixed income and 
lower demand for credit for agricultural investment and consumption smoothing 
purposes. 
The estimates of the model suggest that a majority of farm households (72 percent) 
face a lower reservation cost of credit in the formal sector. The demand for credit is 
fairly high in the region, at 76 percent. The access to the formal sector is 53 percent 
among all households, but conditional on demanding credit from the formal sector, it is 
28 percent. This suggests a high degree of effective credit rationing of 72 percent of the 
households seeking credit from the formal sector. 
 
 
6.    CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The estimation of the three models confirms the general belief in the literature that a 
considerable number of households are credit rationed by the formal sector. The degree 
of the effective rationing suggested by the three models is 71 percent (Model I), 60 
percent (Model II) and 72 percent (Model III). The estimated parameters of the 
two-sector model were used to predict probabilities that were compared to the actual 
distribution in the five groups of households (see  Equation 4) and reflected a similar 
pattern.
16 This suggests good predictive performance by Model III. By construction, 
Model III is the closest to reality and presents the most reliable results of all the three 
models. Given that the two-sector model is the most general model, the relatively lower 
level of credit rationing in Model II could result from a  mis-specification. This would 
imply that the parameter estimates and thus also their predictions cannot be expected to 
be good. 
Some recent literature (Kochar (1997), Bell (1990)) has suggested that the demand 
for credit is low and the role that credit can play in enhancing agricultural development 
is limited. However, most of this empirical evidence is based on data from the 80s which 
was collected from relatively more productive areas. The evidence for higher degree of 
rationing should not be surprising, given that Orissa is one of the poorest states in India
17 
 
16 The estimated parameters of Model 3, were used to predict the probability for every group in equations 
4(a to e). The mean of the estimated probabilities for each group was then compared to the actual probability 
in the data. 
17 Report of the Expert Review Committee, submitted to the Planning Commission in India in 1993.   CREDIT RATIONING IN RURAL INDIA  19
with a high degree of dependence on weather and traditional methods of agriculture.
18 
The estimates in Model III suggest a relatively high demand for credit with fairly large 
credit rationing in Puri, suggesting a need for further development of the credit programs. 
This requires not just increased outreach of credit to the cultivators but also 
well-designed credit facilities that benefit the disadvantaged and not just the rich and 
large landowners. The estimates of Model III reflect the land ownership bias of the 
formal sector as the amount of land owned is a significant determinant of the access to 
formal credit. Recognising that the project lending approach generally followed by the 
banks might not be suitable to the rural poor whose need were small loans and loans for 
short period, credit facilities have been modified by the formal sector in Puri. Some 
steps in this direction have been taken by the promotion of SHG
19 (Self Help Groups) 
by NABARD.   
The results in this paper therefore support the literature that states that credit policies 
still have an important role to play in agricultural development. Given the high demand 
for credit and the limited access to formal credit in Puri, the degree of effective credit 
rationing in Puri is very high. This result holds even when we relax the assumptions that 
all households have a positive demand for formal credit and that the formal sector is the 
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